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I. Introduction
In late 2010 and early 2011, the Tunisian and Egyptian
uprisings constituted some of the foremost political revolutions
facilitated by the Internet, specifically online social networks.'
The online movements and intimately linked off-line
demonstrations united as powerful forces to amplify demands,
share crucial information, and spread their revolutionary messages
to neighboring countries.2 At the same time, activists utilized
these Internet vehicles to fervently diffuse conditions on the
ground to inform and engage global observers.3 This new era of
political activism largely grew and proliferated using business
corporations-social news media and networking sites-as public
forums for protests.4 As the Internet revolutionized political
activism and discourse, its increasing involvement in challenging
repression led authoritarian governments, like China and Iran, to
take controlling measures that collaterally affect international
trade.'
I See Internet Enemies 2011 - China, REPORTERS WITHOUT BORDERS, 16 (Mar.
2011), available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4d822690c.html [hereinafter
Internet Enemies].
2 See id
3 This was demonstrated in Myanmar in 2007, when activists broadcasted the
government's crackdown on Buddhist monks on YouTube. Stephanie Holmes, Burma
Cyber-Dissidents Crack Censorship, BBC NEWS, Sept. 26 2007,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/mobile/bbc news/features/701/70129/story7012984.shtml?40,18,0
7,25,07,2007; see also Anupam Chander, Jasmine Revolutions, 97 CORNELL L. REV.
(forthcoming 2012) (illuminating this symbiotic offline and online relationship of
dissidents by examining the patterns of authoritarian regimes and their use of kill switch
to block the dissemination of demonstration and crackdowns).
4 Chander, supra note 3.
5 Internet Enemies, supra note 1, at 19.
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The Internet forged an intimate link between the global trading
system and human rights by channeling personal-social and
political-activities into profit-generating businesses.6 This link
was substantiated when the Egyptian government shut down the
Internet for five days in early 2011, causing an estimated loss of
USD 90 million.' By requiring foreign Internet service providers
and search engines to censor and filter political contents,
governments simultaneously prevent users from participating in
the international trading system as consumer-participants and
repress users from exercising their freedom of expression,' as
guaranteed under Article 19 of the International Covenant for
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).9 The double-edge nature of
censorship pressed Google and other commentators to argue that
Internet censorship by governments-in both political and cultural
forms-constitutes an "unfair trade barrier," leading them to
appeal for actions through the international trading system.o
6 See generally Internet Enemies, supra note I (discussing global trade and
human rights through the Internet medium).
7 See The Economic Impact ofShutting Down Internet and Mobile Phone Services
in Egypt, ORG. FOR EcON. COOPERATION AND DEV. (Feb. 4, 2011),
http://www.oecd.org/countries/egypt/theeconomicimpactofshuttingdowninternetandmobi
lephoneservicesinegypt.htm.
8 See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights arts. 18, 22, Dec. 16,
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]. The violation of the freedom of expression
on the Internet also violates other rights protected by the ICCPR, including those
addressed in Article 18, the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, and
Article 22, freedom of association with others. Id. arts. 18, 22. Blocking social networks
and political activities on the Internet automatically takes away fora for other social and
religious activities for others. See id.
9 See id.
1o See Bob Boorstin, Promoting Free Trade for the Internet Economy, GOOGLE
PUBLIC POLICY BLOG (Nov. 15, 2010, 10:07 A.M.), http://googlepublic
policy.blogspot.com/2010/11/promoting-free-trade-for-internet.html; see also Google,
the Internet and China: A Nexus Between Human Rights and Trade: Hearing Before the
Congressional Executive Comm. on China, I 11th Cong. 6-8 (2010) (testimony of Ed
Black); Tim Wu, The World Trade Law ofInternet Filtering, 7 CHI. J. INT'L L. 263, 270-
87 (2006) [hereinafter Wu, Internet Filtering] (discussing censorship as a trade barrier);
Brian Hindley & Hosuk Lee-Makiyama, Protectionism Online: Internet Censorship and
International Trade Law 2, 19 (ECIPE, Working Paper No. 12/2009, 2009); EuR. PARL.
Doc. (INI 2185) (2007) (taking a similar stance, the European Parliament passed a
resolution treating Internet censorship as a trade barrier: European Parliament resolution
of 19 February 2008 on the EU's Strategy to deliver market access for European
companies).
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This paper assumes the legitimacy of the proposition that
Internet censoring or related requirements constitute trade barriers
in violation of the most favored nation and national treatment
obligations of the WTO General Agreement on Trade-in Services
(GATS)." The main concern posed by this proposition is that
authoritarian governments can justify internet censorship measures
under the "public morals" exception of GATS Article XIV to
protect legitimate domestic values.12 Thus, this paper examines
the concept of "public morals" and proposes that such concept
serves as a possible linkage between the trade and the human
rights regimes, in the context of China's joint position as the
world's economic powerhouse and Internet censorship champion.
Under the World Trade Organization (WTO) agreements,
governments can take restrictive measures to protect "public
morals" and other legitimate causes." However, some restrictive
measures, such as the Chinese government's censorship of the
Internet, protect "public morals" by repressing certain fundamental
human rights. In the particular case that a trade exception requires
a violation of core human rights, the WTO adjudicating bodies
should account for the existing body of law already established
under the human rights regime in interpreting the protective trade
measure.
Part I introduces the possible areas of linkage-the consumer-
participant services that fuel political activism and the Chinese
government's approach toward repressing those activities-and
then briefly discusses the tension that has historically plagued the
linking of human rights and trade. Part II attempts to formulate
the concept of "public morals" as understood by the various bodies
of international law and instruments applicable to the issue
concerned: the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU)
and GATS Article XIV(a) general exception clause; and the
Human Rights Committee (HRC) and ICCPR Article 19
concerning the freedom of expression. Part III then analyzes the
11 See Wu, Internet Filtering, supra note 10 at 263-65; see Hindley & Lee-
Makiyama, supra note 10, at 13-14.
12 See Wu, Internet Filtering, supra note 10, at 274; see Hindley & Lee-
Makiyama, supra note 10, at 13-14.
13 See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, art. XX, 1867 U.N.T.S. 187
[hereinafter GATT].
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"public morals" exception against existing linkage literature and
suggests that the "public morals" exception provides a narrow and
advantageous linkage for both the trade and human rights regimes.
1I. Linkage: Plagued by Past Power Abuse
Historically, developed countries often use human rights
arguments as an excuse for new protectionism 4 or for asserting
political powers to escape obligations under the WTO.'" Now the
tide has turned: governments use protectionist trade measures-
possibly justified under the "public morals" exception of the
WTO-to violate human rights. This section briefly sets out two
background elements that are crucial to establishing a successful
linkage based on the "public morals" exception: first, the intimate
relationship between the Chinese censorship of political speech
and economic activities; and second, the political history of
linkages between human rights and trade.
A. Political Activities As Consumer-Participant Activities:
the Effect of the Chinese Censorship on Both Trade and
Human Rights
In March 2011, Reporters Without Borders released Internet
Enemies 2010, naming China, by a far margin, "the world's most
consummate censorship regime."' 6 As demonstrated in February
2011 during the Egypt and Tunisia revolutions, China commenced
an "extraordinarily harsh crackdown" on progressives," resulting
in a wave of new disappearances and detentions.18
14 See ERNST-ULRICH PETERSMANN, CONSTITUTIONAL FUNCTIONS AND
CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEM OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW: INTERNATIONAL AND
DOMESTIC FOREIGN TRADE LAW AND FOREIGN TRADE AND FOREIGN TRADE POLICY IN THE
UNITED STATES, THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND SWITZERLAND 100-12 (1991) (offering
characteristics of the new protectionism).
15 See Christine Breining-Kaufmann, The Legal Matrix of Human Rights and
Trade Law: State Obligations Versus Private Rights and Obligations, in HUMAN RIGHTS
AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE, 234-35 (Cottier et. al. eds., 2005) (offering a brief
introduction about proliferation and core issues of trade verses human rights debate and
noting that WTO members are reluctant to approach trade while accounting for human
rights).
16 See Internet Enemies, supra note 1, at 15.
17 See Edward Wong, In Crackdown by Chinese, a New Arrest, N.Y. TIMES, mar.
30, 2011, at A4.
18 See id (discussing how China Human Rights Defenders estimated that at least
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Under the justification of "stability maintenance," China
created the Golden Shield, also known as the Great Firewall, a
large multi-agency Internet censorship regime." The Great
Firewall filtered and censored "sensitive" keywords including
"Tiananmen Square," "Dalai Lama," "democracy,". "human
rights," "Jasmine," and the like.20 In April 2010, China adopted an
amendment to the State Secrets Law requiring Internet and
telecom companies to cooperate with the government on matters
relating to national security by blocking transmission of defined
state secrets, by alerting the government of possible violations,
and by suppressing content.2' In the following summer, the
government instituted another wave of crackdowns on online
networking tools, focusing in particular on micro-blogging
services.22 The government ordered these websites to hire "self-
discipline commissioners" to censor and monitor content that
could threaten the country's security or society's stability,
including illegal activities such as pornography and violence, as
well as rumors and politically sensitive issues.23  The Chinese
government also completely blocked some social networking sites
and websites dedicated to human rights advocacy.2 4
The Chinese government continued to hold a firm position in
response to international pressure against such degree of
censorship.25 The Chinese Council of State's Information Bureau
released the official White Paper on the Internet,26 justifying its
23 people have been detained for criminal investigation; while ChinaGeeks.org compiled
an incomplete list of about 50 Chinese who have been recently detained, arrested, or
made to disappear).
19 See OPENNET INITIATIVE, INTERNET FILTERING IN CHINA 10 (2009), avaliable at
http://opennet.net/sites/opennet.net/files/ONIChina_2009.pdf, see also Internet
Enemies, supra note 1, at 15.
20 See Internet Enemies, supra note 1, at 15.
21 See id at 15; see also STRATFOR GLOBAL INTELLIGENCE, CHINA SECURITY MEMO
(Apr. 29, 2010); Huazhong Wang & Xing Wang, Police to Work with Phone, Internet
Providers, CHINA DAILY, Apr. 27, 2010, at 4.
22 See INTERNET ENEMIES, supra note 1, at 18.
23 See id. at 19.
24 See generally id (discussing Internet shut down effects on human rights).
25 See INFO. OFFICE OF THE STATE COUNCIL OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA,
THE INTERNET IN CHINA § IV (Jun. 8, 2005), http://www.china.org.ch/
government/whitepaper/node_7093508.htm [hereinafter WHITE PAPER].
26 Id. at § IV
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repressive measures as essential to ensuring respect for local laws
and maintaining stability.27 With the recent wave of political
mobilization around the world, the architect of the Golden Shield,
Dr. Fang, declared that further tightening of the Internet would be
needed to counter the number of Internet users trying to
circumvent its control,28 despite the international community's
outcry.
Such censorship of the Internet heavily influences the
international trade system, 29 because Web 2.0 essentially functions
as a trade platform.30 John Battelle and Tim O'Reilly, co-chairs of
the 5th annual Web 2.0 summit, affirmed this trade function by
declaring that on Web 2.0, netizens become the employees who
build the businesses of which they are customers.3 ' User-
generated content, whether in the form of ideas, texts, comments,
pictures, or mindlessly surfing online, contributes economic value
and generates revenue.3 2 Users now become both consumers and
participants, or employees, in building and sustaining the services
themselves.3 3 Without active participants, social networks would
cease to be social or networked. Businesses focusing on social
networks would cease to exist.
Web 2.0 businesses require and depend on the increasing user-
generated activities to sustain their economic existence.34 At the
same time, these user-generated activities include discussing and
disseminating information, forming alliances and networks,
waging protests and mobilizing for change, thus transforming
political activism into economic activities. Any intervention in
these political activities would not only disrupt and prevent social
relationships and human interactions, but it would also interfere
27 See id. at § IV.
28 See Tania Branigan, China's Great Firewall not Secure Enough, Says Creator,
THE GUARDIAN, Feb. 18, 2011, at 8.
29 See Internet Enemies, supra note 1, at 19.
30 See Opening Welcome: The State of the Internet Industry, IT CONVERSATIONS
(Oct. 5, 2004), http://itc.conversationsnetwork.org/shows/detail270.htm [hereinafter
Opening Welcome].
31 See id,
32 See id
33 See id
34 See id
35 See id.
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with international trade.3 6 This intimate relationship, resulting
from having a common Internet platform, raises an opportunity for
a fresh dialogue on the possibility of linking the human rights and
trade regimes.
B. When Potential Becomes Abuse: the Political History of
Linkage
The effort to link political and civil rights to the WTO trade
disputes is not a recent phenomenon." Nontrade arguments have
been connected to trade discussions, mainly through the concept of
linkage." Linkage originated when the explosive growth of
international trade and other social forces converged.3 9 More and
more social issues have infiltrated the trade regime; while
conversely, trade flows have influenced those social norms,
particularly in the areas of human rights, worker's rights, and
environmental protection. 40 For example, the natural emergence
of linkages could be observed during the historic Uruguay Round
and the Seattle Round in the 1990s, which enraged
environmentalists by passing resolutions in the name of free trade
with little consideration for environmental values.4 1
However, support for linking external regimes and social
issues to WTO trade norms has been far from unanimous.42 While
developed nations have sought to link environmental protection
and labor standards to WTO negotiations, developing nations have
exerted equal effort to oppose them.4 3 Thus, "[r]epresentatives to
36 See Khaled Y. Oweis, Syria Blocks Facebook in Internet Crackdown, THOMSON
REUTERS (Nov. 23, 2007), http://www.reuters.com/article/2007/11/23/us-syria-facebook-
idUSOWE37285020071123 (discussing the Syrians' use of Facebook to communicate
with relatives and friends abroad; Facebook also assisted civil society in Syria to form
civic groups outside governments).
37 See David W. Leebron, The Boundaries of the WTO, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 5, 27
(2002) [hereinafter Leebron, Boundaries] (discussing the general concept of linkage).
38 See id.
39 See id.
40 See id. at 5.
41 See GATT Panel Report, United States-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, 40,
DS21/R-39 S/155 (Sept. 3, 1991); see also Appellate Body Report, United States-Import
Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, 25, WT/DS58/AB/R (Nov. 6, 1998)
[hereinafter U.S.-Shrimp/Turtle].
42 See Leebron, Boundaries, supra note 37, at 6.
43 See id
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the WTO from the global South have long opposed the formal or
legal linking of trade and labor issues, particularly in the form of
restrictions on market access or trade sanctions."44
According to Leebron, linkage arguments of the 1990s were
motivated by politics-a structure known as "strategic linkages."A
Strategic linkages depend on negotiation strategies and outcomes,
rather than on the compatibility of norms.46 Due to its political
nature, developing countries opposed this idea of linkage based on
the fear that more developed countries would manipulate it
unfairly to restrict imports.4' Thus, the negative bias against
linkage has been heavily influenced by the motivation behind it
and not by the concept's potential merits.4 8 By way of contrast,
the next section examines linkage specifically on its merits based
on the benefits that linkage brings to mutually strengthen regimes
that have seemingly different goals.
III. "Public Morals" in Trade and Human Rights: Moral Here
but Not There?
The rise of Internet censorship, against the merging of political
activism and consumer-participant trade activities, must at least
suggest re-examining the linkage of trade and human rights values.
Because Internet censorship can be excused under the "public
morals" exception under both regimes, it begs the question: to
what extent are the two concepts of "public morals" similar or
opposing? The two legal frameworks providing for this "public
morals" exception are the WTO's regulations and the ICCPR's
human rights obligations-specifically the GATS Article XIV
general exception provisions and the ICCPR Article 19 freedom of
44 See Jose E. Alvarez, The WTO as Linkage Machine, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 146, 157
(2002).
45 See David W. Leebron, Linkages, 96 AM. J. INT'L. L. 5, 11 (2002) [hereinafter
Leebron, Linkages].
46 See Joel P. Trachtman, Institutional Linkage: Transcending "Trade and. . ." 96
AM. J. INT'L L. 77, 79 (2002) (explaining that one of the results of strategic linkage was
the formation of TRIPS during the Uruguay Round where the United States, the
European Union, and others exchanged concessions in agriculture and textiles for
concessions in intellectual property protection).
47 See id.
48 See id
2012] 115
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
expression provision.49 In order to determine whether linkage
brings mutual benefit to both regimes, one must first identify the
existing body of jurisprudence for the "public morals" exception
under both instruments.
A. The WTO's Dispute Settlement Understanding and a
Nascent Formulation of "Public Morals"
The WTO's "public morals" exception is embodied in several
key regulations,"o while the concept is interpreted and given
meaning by the WTO's Understanding on Rules and Procedures
Governing the Settlement of Disputes (Dispute Settlement
Understanding or DSU)."' In order to determine the possibility of
linkage, it is necessary to examine the authority and corresponding
capacity of the DSU adjudicating bodies to interpret the GATS
Article XIV(a). Relevant international law must also be
examined.
One of the central pillars of the WTO is its ability to settle
disputes through the DSU, which functions as a legal mechanism,
similar to an adversarial system of litigation, for trade disputes.52
This mechanism allows the WTO to address a fundamental flaw in
the public international law system and particularly in human
rights law-the lack of an effective enforcement mechanism.5 3
The WTO dispute resolution mandates require the adjudicating
bodies, consisting of panels and an Appellate Body, to determine
the facts and interpret their relevancy under applicable laws.54
DSU Article 3.2 states that the adjudicating bodies can "clarify the
49 See GATT, supra note 13, art. XX; see ICCPR, supra note 8, art. 19.
50 See General Agreement on Trade in Services art. XIV(a), Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IB, 1869
U.N.T.S. 183 [hereinafter GATS]; see also GATT, supra note 13, art. XX(a); Agreement
on Government Procurement art. XXIII(2), Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 4B, 1915 U.N.T.S. 103; Agreement
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) art. 27(2), Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC,
1869 U.N.T.S. 299.
51 See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes, art. 3.2, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 2, 33 I.L.M 1125 [hereinafter DSU].
52 See id.
53 See id.
54 See id.
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existing provisions of those agreements in accordance with
customary rules of interpretation of public international law." 5
However, in doing so, the adjudicating bodies must assure that
"recommendations and rulings of the Dispute Settlement Body
(DSB) cannot add to or diminish the rights and obligations
provided in the covered agreements." Despite the DSU's
potential for effective enforcement, the regulations do not provide
for a complete legal solution when it comes to multidimensional
disputes. 57  That is, they do not include other laws or policies
beyond trade." Yet, multidimensional disputes characterized
many of the recent environmental decisions of the WTO dispute
resolution bodies." There is no mechanism for integrating diverse
legal rules, e.g., in situations of conflicting interpretations or
conflict of law.60 The limited body of law applicable to the WTO
dispute resolution" and the lack of linkage mechanisms led to
substantive problems.6 2 For example, questions often arose when
particular conduct was restricted by WTO regulations but, at the
same time, required under non-WTO law; or alternatively, WTO
law permitted conduct that would otherwise be forbidden under
55 Id.
56 Id. art. 3.2.
57 See Stefan Ohlhoff & Hannes L. Schloemann, Rational Allocation of Disputes
and "Constitutionalization ": Forum Choice as an Issue of Competence, in DISPUTE
RESOLUTION IN THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 305, 305-08 (James Cameron &
Karen Campbell eds., 1998).
58 See id.
59 See id.
60 See Joel P. Trachtman, The Domain of WTO Dispute Resolution, 40 HARV.
INT'L L.J. 333,338 (1999).
61 See id. But see David Palmeter & Petros C. Mavroidis, The WTO Legal System:
Sources of Law, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 398, 399 (1998) (arguing that the texts of the WTO
agreements "do not exhaust the sources of potentially relevant law"). Palmeter and
Mavroidis refer to articles 3(2) and 7 of the DSU as the ostensible basis for incorporation
of non-WTO international law. Id. However, these provisions refer only to
interpretation of relevant provisions of WTO agreements "in accordance with customary
rules of interpretation of public international law." Id.; see also Thomas J. Schoenbaum,
WTO Dispute Settlement: Praise and Suggestions for Reform, 47 INT'L & CoMp. L.Q.
647, 653 (1998); Appellate Body Report and Panel Report, United States-Standards for
Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, 17, WT/DS2/9 (May 20, 1996) [hereinafter
U.S.-Gasoline] ("[T]he General Agreement is not to be read in clinical isolation from
public international law.").
62 See Trachtman, supra note 60, at 338.
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domestic or other international law.6 3 The question that has
emerged from Internet censorship belongs to the latter: Does the
WTO permit conduct that seeks to violate international human
rights law as justified by the "public moral" exception?
To answer such a question, the values that constitute "public
morals" must first be determined. This subsection examines the
general exception clauses set forth in the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) Article XX64 and GATS Article XIV.6"
The WTO regulations prohibit members from raising trade barriers
as protectionist measures.6 6 However, China and other regimes
that engage in Internet censorship, restrictions, and private
information demands could justify their measures under the
general exception clause for social concerns recognized by
GATS. 67 The relevant portion of GATS Article XIV is:
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in
a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or
unjustifiable discrimination between countries where like
conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on trade in services,
nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the
adoption or enforcement by any Member of measures: (a)
necessary to protect public morals or to maintain public order . .
68
So far, however, few interpretation issues have arisen
regarding GATS provision XIV(a), and the WTO adjudicating
bodies have offered even less guidance. 69  The exception for
"public morals" has not been defined or elaborated during the first
63 See id. at 341.
64 See GATT, supra note 13, art. XX.
65 GATS Article XIV and GATT Article XX will be used interchangeably in this
discussion for the simplification of case law analysis that derives from disputes under the
GATT. Id. art. XIV.
66 See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15,
1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154 [hereinafter Marrakesh Agreement].
67 For a discussion of whether GATS applies to online services, such as search
engines like Google, and to other networking and news media sites, see Wu, Internet
Filtering, supra note 10, at 274-80; Hindley & Lee-Makiyama, supra note 10, at 5-13.
68 GATS, supra note 50, art. XIV(a).
69 But see, e.g., Appellate Body Report, United States-Measures Affecting the
Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, WT/DS285/AB/R (Apr. 7,
2005) [hereinafter U.S.-Gambling] (analyzing and applying GATS provision XIV(a) to
U.S. Wire Act, Travel Act, and Illegal Gambling and Business Act).
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five decades of the parallel provision under GATT Article
XX(a).70 In 2005, the WTO recognized the first "public morals"
exception in U.S.-Gambling, holding that the ban of Internet
gambling services could be based on the ground that it violated
morals."
Research into the travaux prdparatoires of the exception has
likewise been unable to further illuminate the term.7 2 The "public
morals" exception was introduced into the trade regime in 1945.73
Since its introduction, the "public morals" exception has been
consistently incorporated into later drafts.74 Despite its consistent
subsequent appearance, the drafting history and purpose of the
exception provide little information for defining the text
substantively. 75 The drafting records indicate that the clause was
discussed very little, without any discussion on what the term
would encompass.7 ' The only consideration came from the
delegate of Norway, who indicated that Norway's restrictions,
based on the "public morals" exception, concerned mainly
"morality-oriented measures." 7  From 1948 to 2004, the "public
morals" exception clause lay dormant.7 8  At the same time, the
concept continued to be incorporated into various trade
70 See Mark Wu, Note, Free Trade and the Protection of Public Morals: An
Analysis of the Newly Emerging Public Morals Clause Doctrine, 33 YALE J. INT'L L.
215, 216 (2010) [hereinafter Wu, Free Trade and Public Morals].
71 See U.S.-Gambling, supra note 69, at 241-42.
72 "Travaux prdparatoires" is a French phrase that refers to the official records of
negotiations. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 712 (9th ed. 2009).
73 See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, BULL. NO. 2411, PROPOSALS FOR THE EXPANSION OF
WORLD TRADE AND EMPLOYMENT (1945).
74 See U.N. Conf. on Trade and Employment, Oct. 15-Nov. 26, 1946, Rep. of the
First Sess. of the Preparatory Comm., art. 32(a), U.N. Doc. E/PC/T/33; U.N. Conf. on
Trade and Employment, Oct. 15-Nov. 26, 1946, Rep. of the Second Sess. of the
Preparatory Comm, U.N. Doc. E/PC/T/186 (Sept. 10, 1947); U.N. Conf. on Trade and
Employment, Jan. 20-Feb. 25, 1947, Rep. of the Drafting Comm. of the Preparatory
Comm., art. 37(a), U.N. Doc. E/PC/T/34 (Mar. 5, 1947) [hereinafter Rep. of the Drafting
Comm.].
75 See Steve Chamovitz, The Moral Exception in Trade Policy, 38 VA. J. INT'L L.
689, 704-05 (1998).
76 See Wu, Free Trade and Public Morals, supra note 70, at 219.
77 See id.
78 Id.
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instruments.79 Yet, the rarity of exploitation of the clause in more
than five decades questions the need for further interpretation.
B. International Human Rights Law and a Robust Concept of
"Public Morals" in the ICCPR
The acts of Internet censorship, filtering, blocking access to
information and forums, and outright site-blockage potentially
violate WTO agreements and seriously affect human rights en
masse. Internet filtering and data interception violate the freedom
of expression in addition to a multitude of other rights." The most
widely-recognized and binding instrument of international law
protecting these rights is the ICCPR." The ICCPR also acts as the
authoritative version of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (Universal Declaration),82 a document containing principles
protecting basic rights that scholars now consider customary
international law." Additionally, freedom of expression and other
rights are codified in various regional human rights instruments,
such as the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
(IACHR) 84  and the European Convention of Human Rights
79 For extensive lists of trade instruments espousing the "public morals" exception,
see id at 221.
80 Additional rights susceptible include: ICCPR Article 17 (arbitrary or unlawful
interference with privacy, family, home or correspondence), Article 18 (right to freedom
of thought, conscience and religion), and Article 22 (right to freedom of association with
others). See ICCPR, supra note 8, arts. 17, 18, 22.
81 See id.
82 See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter Universal Declaration].
83 See generally ScoTT N. CARLSON & GREGORY GIsvOLD, PRACTICAL GUIDE TO
THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS (2003) (analyzing the
history and effect of the ICCPR).
84 The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights is mandated by the O.A.S.
Charter, the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man (American
Declaration), and the Convention on Human Rights. Specifically, Article IV of the
American Declaration guarantees that "every person has the right to freedom of
investigation, of opinion, and of the expression and dissemination of ideas, by any
medium whatsoever." Ninth Int'l Conf. of American States, The American Declaration
of the Rights and Duties of Man, O.A.S. Res. XXX, (1948), reprinted in Basic
Documents Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter-American System,
OEA/Ser.L.V/II.82 doc.6 rev. 1, 17 (1992) [hereinafter American Declaration], available
at http://cidh.oas.org/Basicos/English/Basic2.American%20Declaration.htm.
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(ECtHR)."
This section specifically discusses the freedom of expression,
often the first of human rights that repressive regimes attempt to
control via the Internet.8" Article 19 of the ICCPR provides that:
(1) Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without
interference.
(2) Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this
right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart
information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either
orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any
other media of his choice.
(3) The exercise of the rights... may therefore be subject to
certain restrictions, but these shall only be such as are provided
by law and are necessary: (b) [for] the protection . .. of
public . . . morals.87
Article 19(3) provides for an exception for state actions that
fulfill certain legal criteria; thus, the protection guaranteed under
Article 19 is not absolute." International human rights law has
interpreted the concept of "public morals" extensively through the
two major bodies of legal jurisprudence, the Human Rights
Committee (HRC) and the ECtHR.8 9 The WTO should examine
these existing bodies of jurisprudence when interpreting the
"public morals" exception in GATS Article XIV.
The similar "public morals" exception in Article 19(3) of the
ICCPR has been scrutinized to a greater extent in the human rights
85 The ECtHR is mandated by the European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, C.E.T.S. No. 5, available at
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b3b04.html. Article 10 guarantees the
freedom of expression. Id.
86 See Stephanie Wang & Robert Faris, Welcome to the Machine, INDEX ON
CENSORSHIP 107 (2008) [hereinafter Welcome to the Machine] (discussing China's
control of free expression online).
87 ICCPR, supra note 8, art. 19.
88 See id.
89 See generally Mukong v. Cameroon, Communication, Human Rights Comm.,
51st Sess., No. 458/1991, 9.7, U.N. Doe. CCPR/C/51/D/458/1991 (1994) [hereinafter
Mukong Communication] (interpreting the concept of "public morals"); Malone v.
United Kingdom, 79 Eur. Ct. H.R. 10, 68 (1984) (interpreting the concept of "public
morals").
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context." Significantly, in Mukong v. Cameroon, the HRC
formulated a strict, three-part test to determine if a state act
violating the freedom of expression can be justified as a measure
protecting legitimate "public morals." 91 International human
rights law permits interference only when the measure is
"necessary to further a legitimate societal aim, and the
interference is prescribed by law."92
The HRC's first prong requires a state measure to be
"prescribed by law[.]"" That is, the measure must be timely and
not "arbitrary or unreasonable," which was interpreted to mean
"precise" and "narrowly tailored." 9 4 More specifically, the HRC
requires that national laws enabling interferences specify in details
the precise circumstances in which such interferences are
permissible 95 and that the laws provide safeguards and remedies to
guard against abuse.96  Often, in cases where private
communications come under surveillance, domestic judicial
bodies must approve the sufficiency of procedural safeguards. 97
The laws prescribing censorships are neither precise nor
tailored with regard to China's surveillance of Internet activities.9 8
Article 19 of the Provisions on the Administration of News
Information Services, issued by the Ministry of Information
90 See, e.g., Mukong Communication, supra note 89 (setting forth conditions for
applying Article 19(3) of the ICCPR).
9' See id 9.7.
92 Brian R. Israel, Note, "Make Money Without Doing Evil?" Caught Between
Authoritarian Regulations in Emerging Markets and a Global Law of Human Rights,
U.S. ICTs Face a Twofold Quandry, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 617, 624 (2009) (emphasis
in original).
93 U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ESCOR], Subcomm'n on Prevention of
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and
Derogation of Provisions in the Int'l Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 15, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/1984/4 (Sept. 28, 1984) [hereinafter Siracusa Principles].
94 See Malone, supra note 89, at 68; Kruslin v. France, 85 Eur. Ct. H.R. 10, 33
(1990); Siracusa Principles, supra note 93.
95 See U.N. ESCOR, Compilation of General Comments and General
Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, 142, U.N. Doc.
HRI/GEN/1/Rev.6 (2003).
96 See Siracusa Principles, supra note 93, 31, 34, 70.
97 See Israel, supra note 92, at 625.
98 See id at 619.
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Industry and the State Council," prohibits any contents "violating
the basic principles" in the Constitution, "jeopardizing the security
of the nation," "harming the honor or the interests of the nation,"
"propagating evil cults," "spreading rumors," and so on."o These
phrases are broad and vaguely defined.0 o Facing such vague
language, a netizen cannot effectively identify whether a criticism
or comment of any aspect of his or her country could fall under
"harming the honor or interest of the nation."' 0 2
The Chinese censorship framework also lacks required judicial
oversight and other procedural safeguards.'03 When Internet
companies disclose user information, they typically fail to specify
what formal procedures are required or what evidentiary standards
are to be met as required by Chinese decree.10 4  Governmental
requests for disclosure of personal information are often informal
and lacking in detail, but Internet service providers have no
discretion to refuse such requests.'
After determining that the concerned measure is "prescribed
by law," the HRC then considers if the measure "protects a
99 See The Ministry of Information Industry and the State Council Information
Office, Provisions on the Admin. of News Information Services, CONGRESSIONAL-
EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA: VIRTUAL ACADEMY, art. 19, (Sept. 25, 2005)
[hereinafter Article 19], available at http://www.isc.org.cn/20020417/ca3l5779.htm
(Chinese) unofficial English translation available at
http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=24396.
100 Id
10i See generally Country Profiles: China, OPENNET INITIATIVE (2012),
http://opennet.net/research/profiles/china [hereinafter OPENNET] (detailing the recent
history of China's Internet censorship).
102 See generally Article 19, supra note 99 ("Neither the News Information posted
or transmitted, nor the current event electronic bulletin service provided, by Internet
News Information Service Work Units may on the Internet include any of the following
content. . . (3) harming the honor or the interests of the nations . . .
103 See OPENNET, supra note 101.
104 See Huliangwang Dianzi Youjian Fuwu Guanli Banfa [Measures for the
Administration of Email Service] (promulgated by the Ministry of Information Industry,
Nov. 7, 2005, effective Mar. 30, 2005) Decree No. 38, available at
http://www.fdi.gov.cn/pub/FDI EN/Laws/GeneralLawsandRegulations/MinisterialRulin
gs/P020060620325844068827.pdf (English).
105 For an example of one such ambiguous request, see Police Document Sheds
Additional Light on Shi Tao Case, Dui HUA NEWS, July 25, 2007,
http://duihua.org/wp/?page id=1888.
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legitimate state interest.""o' The legitimate aims listed under the
ICCPR and the WTO GATS/GATT are similar in that they both
permit any measures falling under protecting "public morals,"
which currently is not defined.' 7
Although a state measure can fall easily under the second
prong-the inchoate category of legitimate aims-the measure
"must be necessary" for the realization of the legitimate
purpose."0 s The necessary element requires that a measure be
narrowly tailored to protect the stated legitimate aim and be
proportional to the societal interest at stake.109 Proportionality was
interpreted to require a high level of causal certainty-that failing
to restrict the specific right would cause the adverse reaction, as
the government claimed."0 The Chinese government uses the
Golden Shield to filter numerous keyword combinations."'
Commenting sections, forums, and other interactive features with
higher risks of containing sensitive content are often shut off
completely." 2 Troublesome bloggers with too many sensitive
posts experience cancelation of their accounts.1" Because these
compulsory control mechanisms are informal and automatic, the
effectiveness of a protective measure is neither proportionate nor
entirely predictable." 4
Additionally, studies demonstrate that censorship control
methods, the amount of content censored, and providers'
transparency about deleting and de-publishing in China vary
substantially."' The Citizen Lab study examined the four most
106 See Sunday Times v. United Kingdom (No. 1), 30 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 1, 35-
38 (1979).
107 See ICCPR, supra note 8, art. 19; GATT, supra note 13, art. XX(a); GATS,
supra note 50, art. XIV(a).
108 See Mukong Communication, supra note 89, 9.7.
109 See id 10.
110 See Sunday Times, 30 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 65-67 (considering the
consequences of dissemination of information subject to an injunction, and comparing
these consequences to the public interest in access to the information).
Ill See Welcome to the Machine, supra note 86.
112 See id
113 See OPENNET, supra note 101.
114 See Welcome to the Machine, supra note 86, at 112-13.
115 See Rebecca MacKinnon, China's Censorship 2.0: How Companies Censor
Bloggers, 14 FIRST MONDAY, no. 2, 2009, http://www.uic.edu/htbin/
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popular search engines in China and concurred that there is no
comprehensive and narrowly tailored system for determining the
contents to be censored, resulting in arbitrary and inconsistent
censoring of information-that is, some terms are censored by
some engines and not by others."' Such inconsistency indicates
that the measure is not narrow."' The inconsistent filtering and
blocking also strongly suggest that the partially censored materials
are not so critically destructive to "public morals" that their
censorship was not absolute across all search engines."'
Opportunely, in April 2003, the then U.N. Commission on
Human Rights provided specific guidance on which measures
cannot be justified under the "public morals" exception." 9
Resolution 2003/4, the Right to Freedom of Opinion and
Expression, warns states against abusing the exception under
Article 19(3) of the ICCPR.120  The Resolution also outlines
specific areas, rather than giving vague suggestions, in which
member states cannot invoke the "public morals" exception.121
These areas include: discussing government policies and political
debate; reporting on human rights, government activities, and
corruption in government; engaging in peaceful demonstration or
political activities, including for peace and democracy; expressing
opinion and dissent; and expressing religion or belief.122  The
Resolution also protects the free flow of information and ideas by
prohibiting the unjustifiable banning or closing of publications or
other media; prohibiting the abuse of administrative measures and
censorship; and guaranteeing access to or use of modem
telecommunication technologies, including radio, television and
the Internet.123
cgiwrap/bin/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/2378/2089 (last visited Oct. 15, 2012).
116 See Nart Villeneuve, Search Monitor Project: Toward a Measure of
Transparency 2-3, (Citizen Occasional Paper No. 1, 2008), availahle at
http://www.upf.edu/materials/fhuma/xiin/mat/search-monitory2.pdf.
117 See id.
118 See id.
1l9 See Comm'n on Human Rights Res. 2003/42, Rep. to the ESCOR, 59th Sess.,
Apr. 23, 2003 at 51, U.N. Doc. No. E/CN.4/2003/L.1 1/Add.4, 51 (Apr. 24, 2003).
120 See id
121 See id
122 See id.
123 See id.
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In 2010, during its one hundredth session, the HRC declared
that penalizing a media outlet, a publisher, or a journalist solely
for being critical of the government or of the political social
system valued by the government, falls outside of the "public
morals" exception under Article 19(3) of the ICCPR.124 The HRC
defined the term "journalists" as "including professional full time
reporters and analysts, as well as bloggers and others who engage
in forms of self-publication in print, on the Internet or
elsewhere."'2 5 This definition permits and extends protection to all
netizens who use the Internet as a platform for expression.
The HRC not only focused on organizations that disseminate
substantive information using the Internet but also defined the
boundary of government interferences for institutions servicing the
Internet.126 The Committee concluded that "any restrictions on the
operation of websites, blogs or any other Internet-based, electronic
or other such information dissemination system, including systems
to support such communication, such as [I]nternet service
providers or search engines [like Google], must be compatible
with paragraph 3," the "public morals" exception of Article 19.127
The Committee also declared that "[g]eneric bans on the operation
of certain sites and systems are not compatible with paragraph
3."'28 Therefore, governments are prohibited from implementing
generic bans on these institutions even under the "public morals"
justification.12 9  Any restrictions with the legitimate aim of
protecting "public morals" must be "content-specific." 3 o
Moreover, in 2010 the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion
and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression
proposed a series of principles for determining whether a
restriction or limitation on the right to freedom of expression is a
124 See U.N. Human Rights Comm., Draft General Comment No. 34, 100th Sess.,
Oct. 11-29, 2011, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC?34/CRP.5 45-46 (Nov. 25, 2010)
[hereinafter General Comment No. 34] (citing U.N. Human Rights Comm., Concluding
Observations on Peru, 70th Sess., U.N. Doc. CCPR/CO/70/PER (Nov. 15, 2000)).
125 Id. T 46.
126 Id. 145.
127 Id.
128 Id.
129 Id.
130 General Comment No. 34, supra note 124, T 30, 45.
[Vol. XXXVIII126
ONLINE AND LINKED IN: PUBLIC MORALS
legitimate measure or an abuse of authority."3 ' The Special
Rapporteur further indicated that these principles should be used
as "a means of ensuring that [s]tates do not abuse restrictions or
limitations for political ends and that the application of such
restrictions or limitations does not cause other rights to be
violated."' 32
Thus, the human rights regime's extensive deliberation on the
"public morals" exception can be of benefit to the budding
examination of the same concept within the WTO. The next
section examines whether the concepts can still be successfully
linked despite the past political impurity of linkage between the
two regimes.
IV. Linking "Public Morals" to the Possibility of a Positive
Sum Game
Given that the WTO's regulations and the ICCPR's provision
share the same terminology in public international law, their
interpretations should naturally present some sort of coherence.'3 3
Furthermore, the trade aspect of Internet censorship concerns a
universal human right, the freedom of expression. Part A of this
section examines the existing framework of linkage to determine
whether linking "public morals" concepts brings benefits to both
regimes. Part B determines whether the WTO adjudicating bodies
have the authority to incorporate human rights jurisprudence into
the definition of the WTO "public morals" exception and
identifies the technical mode of incorporation. Finally, part C
addresses the existing unilateral solution to Internet censorship and
131 Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to
Freedom of Opinion and Expression, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/14/23, 73, 79 (Apr. 20, 2010)
(providing a comprehensive list of factors to be satisfied for censorship to be justified
under the public morals exception of Article 19(3)).
132 Id. T 80.
133 It should be noted that the suggestion that two issues should be linked often
triggers the assumption that the issues cannot be perceived as the same. Leebron,
Boundaries, supra note 37, at 9. As Leebron notes, a more intimate relationship between
two issues is generally rejected once the notion of linkage is established. Id. Here
though, a more intimate relationship cannot practically be established because one of the
"public moral" concepts is presently undefined. Consequently, in analyzing linkage
through interpretive incorporation, this section does not necessarily rule out the
possibility that the "public morals" concepts from each regime could be identically
defined, if the WTO adjudicating bodies determine so.
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attempts to articulate its potential downfall.
A. Linking Specific Human Rights Obligations to the WTO
Regulations
Although the concept of "public morals" in the human rights
regime is well-developed and contemporary to the problem of
online censorship, whether such jurisprudence has any effect on
the trade exception is a question of whether linkage is feasible.'3 4
When it was formed, the WTO did not incorporate classic human
rights.'3 5 The regulations prescribed in the WTO agreement focus
on guaranteeing the equal treatment of foreign goods by WTO
members.' 36 This narrow focus reflects a general understanding
that trade is an instrument, rather than a value.'3 7 It is also
affirmed in practice, as the WTO has gradually isolated itself from
the broader institutional setting of public international law.'
More specifically, the WTO dispute resolution panels and the
Appellate Body are restricted to the interpretation and enforcement
of WTO law and are unauthorized to apply general substantive
international law or other conventional international law.'3 9 This
limitation is reasonable given that various fields of substantive
international law already have their own judicial bodies, such as
the Human Rights Committee in its oversight of human rights.'4 0
134 See id at 14.
135 See Gabrielle Marceau, WTO Dispute Settlement and Human Rights, 13 EUR. J.
INT'L L. 753, 774 (2002) [hereinafter Marceau, WTO Dispute Settlement] (quoting Rep.
of the Int'l Law Comm'n on the Work of its 51st Sess., May I-June 9, July 10-Aug. 18,
2000, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/504, 15 (Feb. 8, 2000)) (noting that the International Law
Commission (ILC) recognized the WTO, then arguing that self-containment or a lex
specialis regime should not have "any negative or hermetic connotation").
136 JOOST PAUWELYN, CONFLICT OF NORMS IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 71
(James Crawford & John S. Bell eds., 2003).
137 Id. at 73 (proposing that trade liberalization "is not sought after for the
achievement of some 'global common' that transcends the sum total of individual state
interests"; rather, the purpose of the WTO rules is to increase the economic welfare of
the states, while social and other benefits are determinate on what states do with their
economic welfare).
138 See generally P.J. Kuyper, The Law of GA TT as a Special Field ofInternational
Law, 25 NETH. Y.B. INT'L L. 227, 228 (1994) (assessing whether the WTO has become a
self-contained regime and identifying specific areas in which the WTO has deviated
from general principles of international law).
139 Marceau, WTO Dispute Settlement, supra note 135, at 763.
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Additionally, the WTO lacks the resources to adjudicate both trade
and human rights violations.14 '
However, if the adjudicating bodies were to interpret anew
concepts already established elsewhere in the course of applying
the terms of the WTO agreements, the result would be parallel and
conflicting standards. 4 2  Thus, when faced with the task of
interpreting concepts that have existing counterparts in other
regimes, the WTO should refrain from unnecessarily creating a
diverging or conflicting set of interpretations. For reasons of
economic conservation and cohesiveness in public international
law, the WTO adjudicating bodies should instead contemplate
linking the existing bodies of interpretation.'43
This section examines and analyzes a framework set forth by
Leebron and Alvarez for determining the different types and
feasibility of linkage, discussing only factors pertinent to the
linking of the two "public morals" exceptions.'4 4 This section
examines the linking of "public morals" jurisprudence in three
parts: (1) whether the human rights and the WTO's concepts of
"public morals" constitute legitimate issue areas; (2) whether the
concerns underlying the possible linkage are unfounded; and (3)
whether the WTO allows for the process of interpretive
incorporation to elaborate on an undefined term.
1. The concepts of "public morals "from both regimes
are legitimate and narrow issues to be linked
Linking the concepts of "public morals" constitutes an issue
area linkage-one that is "between relatively narrow questions on
which well-defined resolutions can be reached."' 4 5 Broadly
speaking, the censoring of the Internet is an issue area of concern
140 Gudrun Monika Zagel, WTO & Human Rights: Examining Linkages and
Suggesting Convergence, INT'L DEv. LAW ORG. VOICES DEV. JURISTS, no. 2, 2005, at 20,
available at http://www.worldtradelaw.net/articles/zagelhumanrights.pdf (citing U.N.
ESCOR, Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by
Human Rights Treaty Bodies, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.7 (May 12, 2004)).
141 Id. at 20.
142 Id.
143 See Marceau, WTO Dispute Settlement, supra note 135, at 779.
144 See generally Leebron, Boundaries, supra note 37 (providing a complete
overview of the linkage framework).
145 Id. at 6.
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to both the human rights and the trade regimes, based on the
Internet's inherent function as an information- and trade-sharing
platform. Narrowly speaking, the exception of "public morals" to
state action is an even more specific question.14 6
According to Leebron, issue areas are determined "not only by
agreement but also by the normative relationship of the issues to
each other." 47  It seems unlikely that there is an expressed
agreement for what could qualify as a justification for "public
morals." 48  But in terms of the normative and descriptive
dimensions, the trade and human rights regimes' Internet
censorship, as justified under the "public morals" exception,
constitute "areas of regulation or negotiation that are substantively
very closely related in the sense that they ought to be dealt with in
a single regulatory context and are in fact widely seen as requiring
such bundling because of this substantive relationship." 49  First,
the Internet transforms the demonstration of political rights into a
subset of consumer participant activities; therefore, an act
repressing political rights automatically interferes with trade.5 o
Second, "public morals" must be based on unique cultural and
social practices."' Therefore, when a state raises a "public
morals" justification in the trade framework, the justification's
underlying social and cultural practices must logically constitute
evidence of a public moral in another framework, such as human
146 It must also be noted that this discussion does not and should not assume that
the linking of "public morals" between the human rights and the trade regimes connotes
a general linkage of the two regimes. Leebron, Boundaries, supra note 37, at 10
("Regime linkage may not differ significantly from issue area linkage with regard to the
substantive claim that issues should be linked, but it poses different institutional
questions.").
147 Id. at 9.
148 Marceau, WTO Dispute Settlement, supra note 135, at 789 ("There is no WTO
jurisprudence interpreting such concepts, and it is far from clear whether the violation of
human rights could be covered by any WTO exceptions.").
149 Leebron, Boundaries, supra note 37, at 9.
150 See infra Part II.A.; Wu, Internet Filtering, supra note 10, at 281-84 (listing
three specific scenarios when censorship measures breach a member's market access and
national treatment obligation: (1) declaring foreign blogging sites off limits; (2) requiring
foreign service providers to route offerings through traffic cops; and (3) requiring local
Internet service providers to deny access to certain services).
151 General Comment No. 34, supra note 124, 133.
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rights.15 2  Thus, the two concepts must be structurally and
substantively related.'"' Both the WTO agreements and the
ICCPR allowed for the same exception regarding state action,'54 so
both regimes have agreed that there is a consensus but have failed
to articulate what the consensus entails.
2. Arguments Favoring Linkage
The second component of the linkage framework addresses the
arguments integral to the concept of linkage. Based on these
arguments, this section claims that linkage of the "public morals"
concept will result in a positive sum game for both regimes.
The "public morals" justification for Internet censorship
constitutes a substantive rather than strategic linkage.' This type
of linkage is based on the connection between the norms rather
than negotiations between members.'16  The substantive
relationship of the "public morals" exception satisfies both the
coherence-based and consequentialist claims for linkage.'5 7
First, a coherence claim is based "either on the congruence of
the norms governing the linked issues, or on the conflict between
them."" 8 If the norms are congruent, then establishing a linkage
would assure their continued coherence.'59 Procedurally, the WTO
jurisprudence is similar to that of the ICCPR in that the "public
morals" exception must satisfy a two-tier analysis: (1) whether the
measure of censorship falls under one of the legitimate objectives
of "public morals";"'s and (2) whether there exists a sufficient
nexus between the measure and the objective pursued.'6 1
152 See id.
153 See supra text accompanying notes 149-153.
154 ICCPR, supra note 9, at 178; GATT, supra note 13, at Annex IA.
155 See Leebron, Boundares, supra note 37, at 11.
156 Id.
157 Id. (identifying coherence-based and consequentialist as two types of
substantive linkage claims).
158 Id.
I59 Id
160 See Appellate Body Report, Mexico-Taxes on Soft Drinks and Other
Beverages, 72, WT/DS308/AB/R (Mar. 6, 2006); U.S.-Shrimp/Turtle, supra note 41,
1 116.
161 U.S.-Gambling , supra note 69, 292; see generally Panagiotis Delimatsis,
Determining the Necessity of Domestic Regulations in Services, 19(2) EUR. J. INT'L L.
1312012]
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Similarly, the ICCPR permits states to interfere with the freedom
of expression through the "public morals" exception only when
the measure is prescribed by law, addresses one of the aims set
forth in the exception, and is necessary to further a legitimate
societal aim.16 2 Both bodies also formally recognize that what
constitutes "public morals" varies over time and inter-culturally.163
Because both adjudicating bodies have approached these concepts
similarly, they are procedurally coherent.164
In contrast, substantive coherence--defined as similar or
conflicting norms-cannot thus far be determined. 165  The term
"public morals" has been defined only within the human rights
framework.166 However, several scholars have suggested that the
WTO should interpret the "public morals" concept dynamically to
include human rights and labor rights, given that human rights are
considered to be at the core of public morality.167 The U.N. High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) also endorsed interpreting
the "public morals" exception of the WTO to include "concern for
human personhood, dignity, and capacity reflected in fundamental
rights," further stating that "excluding notions of fundamental
rights would simply be contrary to the ordinary contemporary
365 (2008) (proposing the implementation of a necessity test for the WTO in making
determinations on the legitimacy of regulations).
162 Mukong Communication, supra note 89, 9.7.
163 Siracusa Principles, supra note 93, T 27; U.S.-Gambling, supra note 69, 296
("[T]he Panel found that the term 'public morals' denotes standards of right and wrong
conduct maintained by or on behalf of a community or nation.").
164 See supra text accompanying notes 159-163.
165 See, e.g., Leebron, Boundaries, supra note 37, at 11.
166 Marceau, WTO Dispute Settlement, supra note 135, at 789.
167 Wu, Free Trade and Public Morals, supra note 70, at 224; see Stephen J.
Powell, The Place of Human Rights Law in World Trade Organization Rules, 16 FLA. J.
INT'L L. 219, 223 (2004) ("Article XX(a) likely... would support state action on a
number of other human rights concerns, which might prompt a WTO Member to ban
trade to protest immoral acts by a foreign government against its citizens, such as
products made by indentured children or ... with a consistent pattern of gross violations
of human rights."); Salman Bal, International Free Trade Agreements and Human
Rights: Reinterpreting Article XX of the GATT, 10 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 62, 78
(2001) ("Another way to include human rights in Article XX(a) is to consider certain
human rights as 'moral standards."'); Marceau, Dispute Settlement. supra note 135, at
789 ("In the context of import restrictions imposed for human rights considerations, a
WTO Member may want to justify its actions by invoking the exception for 'public
morals' in GATT Article XX(a) . . . .").
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meaning of the concept."l 6 8 Collectively, these sources point to a
future of substantive coherence between the "public morals"
exception and fundamental human rights.
Second, a consequentialist type of substantive linkage claim
focuses on the aligned policy goals of the linked regimes, rather
than on the relationship between norms.169 Leebron suggests that
"[i]f the application of the rules of one regime would undermine
the achievement of the goals of another, it may be desirable to
reformulate the rules of the first regime so that the goals of the
second can be achieved." 70  It should be noted that
consequentialist claims often assume conflict between the norms
of two regimes."' Despite the absence of conflict due to the lack
of definition of "public morals" in the trade regime, context
indicates that conflicts are often presumed between the two
regimes. 17 Despite the presumed conflict, the linkage of the
narrow concepts of "public morals" actually would help mutually
strengthen the seemingly diverging purposes of two regimes. 73
Because the history of linkage has been riddled by politics, the
potential for mutual benefit has not been fully examined or
accepted.174 Linkage was not a universally desirable concept for
WTO members for many reasons.'7 ' During the 1990s, developed
countries were engaging in strategic linkage of human rights and
labor standards, 7 6 which led developing countries to allege that
such rhetoric amounted to nothing but protectionism disguised as a
168 Office of the U.N. High Comm'r for Human Rights, Human Rights and World
Trade Agreements: Using General Exception Clauses to Protect Human Rights, 5, U.N.
Doc. HR/PUB/05/5 (2005).
169 Leebron, Boundaries, supra note 37, at 12.
170 Id.
171 Id
172 Sungjoon Cho, Linkage of Free Trade and Social Regulation: Moving Beyond
the Entropic Dilemma, 5 CHI. J. INT'L L. 625, 626 (2004-05).
173 Id. at 674.
174 See generally id. at 628-69 (summarizing the history of linkage in the context of
the "bitter social upheaval" that accompanied the evolution of global trade).
175 See generally id. at 632-33 (exploring arguments against linkage).
176 See generally Leebron, Boundaries, supra note 37, at 12-13 (defining strategic
linkage as an alternative to substantive linkage, in which links are based on political
reciprocity rather than substantive similarities in issues).
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moral high ground."' Leebron advises that linkage "ought not to
substitute for attempts to formulate and improve the distinct
international regimes that govern the linked areas" because that
tends to cause frustration for borrowing regimes."' Other scholars
believe that linkage would be detrimental to both regimes,
resulting in "the loss of the traditional economic benefits of trade
liberalization" and diminished "regulatory objectives of linked
subjects."' 7 9 However, rhetoric has also perpetuated this
presumption of negative consequences."80 Cho states that such an
approach of affirming the negative "often leads to a 'dialogue of
the deaf framed in terms such as of '[f]ree trade versus labor
standards' or 'growth versus the environment."" 8' Thus, Cho
proposed that the global trading system should adopt a more
"positive perspective on linkage in order to transform international
trade into a positive sum game."' 82
The "public morals" linkage would empower both the trade
and human rights regimes, rather than weaken them.'18  Unlike the
1990s usage of linkage to justify protectionist measures and
damage trade liberalization,'84 this narrow "public morals" linkage
actually prevents member states from instating protectionist
measures justified by insincere moral reasons.' Because
fundamental human rights represent the bare minimum of rights
177 Jose M. Salazar-Xirinachs, The Trade-Labor Nexus: Developing Countries'
Perspectives, 3 J. INT'L ECON. L. 377, 380 (2000) (providing a well-documented
explanation of developing countries' concerns with linking trade and labor issues); Cho,
supra note 172, at 632.
178 Leebron, Boundaries, supra note 37, at 27.
179 Cho, supra note 172, at 633 (noting that scholars such as Jim Rollo, Alan
Winters, and Frieder Roessler take the position that linkage will result in lowered
standards and benefits for both regimes).
180 See id at 645.
181 Id. (quoting Renato Ruggiero, Former Dir. Gen., WTO, A Shared
Responsibility: Global Policy Coherence for Our Global Age, Address to the Conference
on "Globalization as a Challenge for German Business: Export Opportunities for Small
and Medium-Sized Companies in the Environmental Field" (Dec. 9, 1997) (transcript
available at http://www.wto.org/english/news e/sprr e/bonne.htm)).
182 Id. at 646 (emphasis in original).
183 See id (noting that international trade leads to better social conditions, while
regulatory improvement benefits international trade).
184 See id. at 646.
185 See Wu, Free Trade and Public Morals, supra note 70, at 244-45.
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unalienable to all persons,"' overriding the most fundamental of
rights requires the state's public moral concern to be of a serious
caliber.' This linkage raises the threshold of when the "public
moral" concern is sufficient.' 8 This threshold can be lowered
accordingly when the values violated are not fundamental to all
persons, such as social- or cultural-specific preferences.'
The heightened threshold would act to reduce unilateral
protectionist measures and support the WTO's pursuit of trade
liberalization.'90 By requiring that certain moral norms be shared
universally, or at least be recognized by some international
instruments and institutions, this type of linkage prevented the
"public morals" exception from becoming an open forum for
unilateral actions for and against particular values."' Similarly
proposed by Wu, inward-imposed, unilateral restriction based on
"public morals" must demonstrate roots in domestic legislation,
and some international treaty or guideline must codify the moral
norm at stake.'9 2 Equally, on the other hand, countries imposing
outward restrictions on another member must demonstrate that the
targeted state has endorsed the "public moral" violation in
question.193
Moreover, the linkage of "public morals" with WTO
jurisprudence strengthens the human rights regime by reaffirming
that certain moral and legal values are indeed universal.'9 4 Thus,
the linkage of "public morals" would ensure a positive-sum game
for both the trade and the human rights field.'
186 See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 809 (9th ed. 2009).
187 See Wu, Free Trade and Public Morals, supra note 70, at 240 (explaining that in
order to justify taking trade actions in the name of public morals, a state would have to
show evidence of its commitment to the particular norm at issue).
18 See id.
189 See id. at 240-42 (implying, through the example of Burma and China's
censorship policies, that a transnational approach to action under the public morals
exception would accommodate national and cultural preferences).
190 See id. at 244-45.
19' See id. at 240.
192 See id. at 241.
193 See Wu, Free Trade and Public Morals, supra note 70, at 246.
194 See id. at 240.
195 See Cho, supra note 172, at 646.
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3. The WTO's regulations permit interpretative
incorporation.
The third component of linkage examines the structure within
which "public morals" linkage can be actualized. 9 6  Leebron
identified several types of linkage structures accommodating
different relationships between regimes and issue areas."' Instead
of taking the broad route of membership linkage or incorporation
of entire issues areas,'98 the linking of "public morals" is based on
a very narrow interpretative issue linkage structure."' That is,
only a specific provision in an issue area is identified and linked
while other components remain detached.20 0 The narrow issues of
"public morals" can best be linked through interpretative
incorporation.20 ' This mode is particularly applicable when the
linked provisions function as the exception clause in both regimes,
have the same procedural requirements, and only one of the
regimes is extensively developed.2 02
B. Interpretative Incorporation of "Public Morals" and Its
Permissibility
This section analyzes the interpretative mode of linkage, which
relates to how the human rights jurisprudence of the term "public
morals" could be incorporated into the WTO agreements to
2031 fitrrtvarticulate its "public morals" exception. If interpretive
incorporation is to have legitimate value, the DSU must first
permit it.204 After determining the adjudicating bodies' authority,
human rights jurisprudence can be incorporated. Finally, the
discussion attempts to identify implied consent from China for this
196 See Leebron, Boundaries, supra note 37, at 15.
197 Leebron identified the linkage structure to include several types. See id at 15-
24 (providing a more detailed description of these types).
198 See id. at 20 (stating that membership linkage and issue areas incorporation,
while at opposite ends of the linkage spectrum, both take a wholesale approach to the
linkage problem).
199 See id. at 21.
200 See id. at 20.
201 See id. at 21.
202 See Leebron, Boundaries, supra note 37, at 20-22; see also Wu, Free Trade and
Public Morals, supra note 70, at 217-25.
203 The interpretive analysis in this section is more in-depth than Leebron's steps.
204 See Leebron, Boundaries, supra note 37, at 21.
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form of incorporation.
1. The WTO adjudicating bodies have the authority to
consult the HRC's body of interpretation.
The DSU's Article 3.2 states that the WTO adjudicating bodies
could "clarify the existing provisions of' the covered WTO
agreements in accordance with customary rules of interpretation in
public international law.20 5 In doing so, the adjudicating bodies
"cannot add to or diminish the rights and obligations provided in
the covered agreements." 206 Notably, the general interpretation in
public international law is to interpret so as to avoid conflict
wherever possible.20 7 The obligation of the panels and the
Appellate Body not to "add to or diminish the rights and
obligation provided in the covered agreements" does not constitute
a general conflict clause of the WTO regulations against other
international legal norms. 208  Legal scholars asserted that such
provisions could not be interpreted to mean "that no other law, be
it pre- or post-1994, can ever influence WTO-covered
agreements." 2 09 Even in the case of conflict, such provisions shall
not automatically permit the WTO rule to prevail over other
international norms.210
The DSU's Article 3.2 does not address the jurisdiction of the
panels or the applicable law before them; it only deals with the
inherent limit of the panels as a judicial organ for interpreting the
WTO-covered agreements.211 The Appellate Body confirmed the
205 DSU, supra note 51, art. 3.2.
206 Id.
207 See Ralph G. Steinhardt, The Role ofInternational Law as a Canon ofDomestic
Statutory Construction, 43 VAND. L. REv. 1103, 1104-05 (1990).
208 See Lorand Bartels, Applicable Law in WTO Dispute Settlement Proceedings,
35 J. WORLD TRADE 499, 507 (2001) (quoting DSU, supra note 51) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (stating that, if the provision meant the complete exclusion of public
international law, the long series of the Appellate Body reports to which general
international law referred would be legally incorrect, and the WTO panels would be
prevented from applying general international law to "fill gaps" left open because doing
so would "add" to the WTO agreements).
209 See Joost Pauwelyn, The Application ofNon-WTO Rules ofInternational Law in
WTO Dispute Settlement, in THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: LEGAL, ECONOMIC AND
POLITICAL ANALYSIS 1421 (Patrick F. J. Macrory et al. eds., 2005).
210 See id.
211 See id.
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specificity of this interpretive limit by stressing that "[a]n
interpreter is not free to adopt a reading that would result in
reducing whole clauses or paragraphs of a treaty to redundancy or
inutility."2 12 Moreover, by referencing the general rules of
interpretation of the Vienna Convention, the WTO provision
further stresses that the restriction applies narrowly to the
interpretative function of the panels, not to how the panels should
determine applicable laws or resolve conflicts of norms.2 13
In addition, when examining trade claims, the adjudicating
bodies may have to refer to and apply non-WTO rules of
international law.2 14 According to case law, it is now generally
accepted that panels can do so in the interpretation of terms set
forth in the agreements.2 15 Standard practice allows the
adjudicating bodies to apply certain rules of general international
law in matters on which the WTO agreements are silent.216 This
application of "secondary" rules of general international law-
laws that are "binding on all WTO Members and from which the
WTO treaty did not "contract out" 2 17-further requires that
member states be bound to "primary" rules of law.2 18 Primary
rules are substantive laws that directly impose rights and
obligations on the states, including customary laws and general
principles of law on the use of force, genocide, and human
rights.219 Unless a treaty or WTO agreement, contracts out of a
rule of general international law, the aforementioned principle
remains valid.22 0 In such a case, despite restricting the Appellate
Body and panels from applying substantive international law, the
GATT does not explicitly contract out specific obligations of
212 U.S.-Gasoline, supra note 61, at 23; see also Appellate Body Report, Japan-
Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages 12, WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS 10/AB/R (Oct. 4, 1996).
213 See Pauwelyn, supra note 209, at 1421-22.
214 See id.
215 See id at 1421.
216 See id
217 Id. at 1424.
218 See id at 1424-25.
219 See generally H. L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 92-93 (Oxford Univ. Press
2nd ed. 1961) (explaining that primary rules, such as prohibitions on violence and
deception, although often unofficial or customary, are the basic obligations to which any
group that is to function with relative peace must adhere).
220 See Pauwelyn, supra note 209, at 1407.
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international human rights law.221' This means that WTO member
states are still bound to "primary" rules of international law.
Finally, even if the DSU's Article 3.2 only mandates that
interpretation be in accordance with the general interpretive
principles of public international law, legal scholars have read the
provision to require incorporation of other principles of
international law pursuant to Article 31 of the Vienna
Convention.2 22 This is especially true when the WTO agreements
refer to concepts that can be or are already understood in light of
international legal jurisprudence. 2 23  At the same time, Article 31
of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,224 the general
rule of interpretation, has been used independently to define legal
relationships between trade measures and environmental law,225
human rights, and labor standards.22 6
2. Interpretive incorporation offundamental human
rights jurisprudence as customary norms.
The panels' authority to interpret the terms of the general
exception clause, which is within the scope of its mandate, is to
interpret the term of the agreement without adding or omitting any
rights and obligations under the agreement.22 7 Importing the
human rights interpretation of the terms "public morals" only
functions to clarify and give shape to the general exception clause
221 See id at 1417-18, 1424-25.
222 See Marceau, WTO Dispute Settlement, supra note 135; see also Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 31(3)(c), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331
[hereinafter Vienna Convention] ("There shall be taken into account, together with the
context: . . . Any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between
the parties.").
223 See Gabrielle Marceau, A Call for Coherence in International Law: Praises for
the Prohibition Against "Clinical Isolation" in WTO Dispute Settlement, 33 J. WORLD
TRADE 87, 87-123 (1999) [hereinafter Marceau, A Callfor Coherence].
224 See Vienna Convention, supra note 222.
225 See US.-Shrimp/Turtle, supra note 41, 114.
226 See, e.g., Sarah H. Cleveland, Human Rights Sanctions and International Trade:
A Theory of Compatibility, 5 J. INT'L ECON. L. 133, 149 (2002) (attempting to reconcile
GATT with the international human rights regime by asserting that Article 31(3)(c) of
the Vienna Convention requires WTO panels to interpret GATT provisions consistently
with international human rights law).
227 See DSU, supra note 51.
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in a concrete manner for practical application.22 8 The right of a
member state to raise a "public morals" exception remains
available as intended, without any additional rights or obligations
entailed.22 9
One hundred and thirty one members of the WTO ratified or
signed the ICCPR, the legally binding instrument of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR).23 0  Even member states
such as China,231 although it has yet to ratify the ICCPR, must
adhere to the obligations and interpretation of the HRC regarding
the concepts of "public morals" as they relate to the rights of
expression and privacy.2 32 First, according to Marceau, requiring
that all WTO members of a dispute be parties to a non-WTO rule
of international law before that non-WTO rule can be used to
interpret WTO obligations is problematic and unrealistic.233 Such
a requirement would result in a multitude of problems:
inconsistencies and incoherence between systems of law;
restricting the number of outside legal principles available under
Vienna Convention Article 31(3)(c); and the further isolation of
the WTO as its membership increases.234 Furthermore, the
requirement of membership contradicts the previous principle
adopted by the Appellate Body in U.S.-Shrimp, which examines
228 See Cleveland, supra note 226, at 157-63 (arguing that incorporation of human
rights norms into international trade dispute resolution is consistent with Article XX of
GATT).
229 See id at 180-81.
230 Compare International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for
signature Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976)
[hereinafter ICCPR Ratification Status] (listing participants in the ICCPR and the
respective dates of accession and ratification), with Members and Observers,
UNDERSTANDING THE WTO: THE ORGANIZATION,
http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/whatis-e/tif e/org6_e.htm (last visited Oct. 15,
2012) (listing the members and observers of the WTO, along with the dates of
membership).
231 See ICCPR Ratification Status, supra note 230 (noting that China has not
ratified the ICCPR but signed it on October 5, 1998).
232 See Marceau, WTO Dispute Settlement, supra note 135, at 789-91 (noting that
the WTO panels, when determining the necessity of an action pursued in the name of
protecting public morals, should consider the participation of all concerned members in
international human and civil rights agreements as evidence of the importance of the
values at issue, the efficacy of the action taken, and the good faith of the acting member).
233 See id at 781.
234 See id
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various multilateral, environmental agreements that did not have
the same membership as the WTO.235  Regardless of the
membership inconsistency, some of the definitions in the various
environmental agreements were considered to have sufficient
consensus. 236
Secondly, and most importantly, the freedom of expression
coded in the ICCPR and UDHR is part of the general principles of
law, or customary international law.23 7 Customary laws, or general
principles of law, are the legal norms the panels and Appellate
Body have discretion to use as guides in interpreting WTO-
covered agreements.238 Moreover, all members of the United
Nations, through the General Assembly, adopted the UDHR in
1948, regardless of its non-binding nature.2 39 Subsequently, most
of the WTO members ratified the binding ICCPR.2 40  Most
members are also bound by regional human rights instruments
such as the European Convention on Human Rights (ECtHR),24 1
the African Charter on Human and People's Rights (Banjul
235 See US.-Shrimp/Turtle, supra note 41, 1 130 (noting that Thailand and the
United States had signed but not ratified the Convention on Biological Diversity; India
and Pakistan had ratified the Convention on the Law of the Sea, while Thailand had
signed but not ratified it, and the United States is not a party to it).
236 See id. % 127-34 (noting that in spite of slight variance in language,
"exhaustible natural resources" has been interpreted similarly under several
environmental agreements).
237 See J.P. Humphrey, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Its History,
Impact and Juridical Character, in HUMAN RIGHTS: THIRTY YEARS AFTER THE
UNIVERSAL DECLARATION 28-29 (B.G. Ramcharam ed., 1979); see also U.S. Diplomatic
and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3, 1 91 (May 24).
238 See ANT6NIo AUGUSTO CAN4ADO TRINDADE, UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF
HUMAN RIGHTS (2008), available at http://untreaty.un.org/cod/av/pdf/
haludhr/udhr e.pdf; see also Montreal Statement of the Assembly for Human Rights,
Mar. 22-Mar. 27, 1968, 9 J. INT'L COMM'N JURISTS, June 1968, at 94, 95; U.N. Human
Rights Council, Human Rights in Palestine and Other Occupied Arab Territories, i1
1369-71, U.N. Doc. A/HR/12/48 (Sept. 25, 2009) (recognizing that the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights has become part of international customary law).
239 See Universal Declaration, supra note 82.
240 See ICCPR Ratification Status, supra note 230.
241 See European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222, available at http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/
rdonlyres/D5CC24A7-DC l3-4318-B4575C9014916D7A/0/CONVENTIONENG
WEB.pdf.
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Charter),242 the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of
Man,243 and the American Convention on Human Rights.2 44
Finally, members have codified similar freedoms of expression
and privacy in their national constitutions. 2 45 Given that the trade
regime's "public morals" concept has not been substantively
defined, good faith interpretations of the WTO agreements should
reflect relevant international law obligations and a presumption
against conflicts between trade and human rights obligations.2 46
The existing body of interpretations of the "public morals"
concept in human rights law could serve as a heightened threshold,
limiting what qualifies as a reasonable, legitimate aim when the
measure in question violates a fundamental human right. When
WTO disputes concern trade barriers and "public morals"
unrelated to human rights violations, the adjudicating bodies
should formulate their own interpretations of trade law. When
fundamental human rights are in jeopardy, however, the HRC is
better qualified to formulate the outer boundary of legal
permissiveness.24 7
To understand the full implication of linking the "public
morals" concepts between the WTO and the HRC, the reverse
scenario in which the WTO institutions interpret "public morals"
in isolation should be examined. If the WTO adjudicating bodies
were to permit "public morals" justifications to extend beyond the
boundary provided by the HRC, then the two bodies of law would
conflict and violate Article 53 of the Vienna Convention.24 8 If the
less restrictive interpretation were permitted despite the conflict,
then states would have no incentive to adhere to the principles set
242 African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights ("Banjul Charter"), Jun. 27,
1981, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982), available at http://www.unhcr.org/
refworld/docid/3ae6b3630.html.
243 American Declaration, supra note 84, at 5.
244 American Convention on Human Rights, Pact ofSan Jose, Costa Rica, Nov. 22,
1969, available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b365I0.html.
245 In particular, Article 35 of the 1982 Constitution of the People's Republic of
China proclaims that "[c]itizens of the People's Republic of China enjoy freedom of
speech, of the press, of assembly, of association, of procession and of demonstration."
XIANFA art. 35 (1982).
246 See Marceau, WTO Dispute Settlement, supra note 135, at 805.
247 See id. at 786-89.
248 Vienna Convention, supra note 222, at 18.
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out in the ICCPR.249 The WTO would then become a vehicle for
enabling oppressive governments in their justification of domestic
measures that fall under the trade regime and are intended to
restrict human rights. In short, not having congruent
interpretations would effectively weaken both the human rights
and trade regimes, allowing for the proliferation of unilateral
protectionist measures that also purposefully and directly violate
human rights.
3. The WTO adjudicating bodies have already engaged
in interpretive incorporation ofjurisprudence
external to the WTO agreements
Even though the WTO agreements do not substantially define
the concept of "public morals," the incorporation of existing
jurisprudence from outside the WTO has been applied in
practice.2 50 In a separate provision of the general exceptions
clause, the adjudicating bodies reached out to international laws
external to the WTO.25 ' The Appellate Body has emphasized the
incorporation of public international law in interpreting the WTO
agreements as well. 25 2  The case of U.S.-Shrimp/Turtle
demonstrated the utilization of non-WTO law to interpret one of
the general exceptions under GATT XX. 253 In a complete defense
of living resources, the Appellate Body found that Article XX(g),
which allows member states to impose measures to conserve
"exhaustible natural resources," logically includes living
resources, such as turtles. 254 Even though the history of Article
XX(g) only discussed mineral resources as "exhaustible," the
Appellate Body endorsed an evolving approach to interpretation
with its decision.25 5 The term "exhaustible natural resources"
"must be read by a treaty interpreter in the light of contemporary
concerns of the community of nations about the protection and
249 See ICCPR, supra note 8.
250 See Marceau, WTO Dispute Settlement, supra note 135, at 778.
251 See GATT, supra note 13.
252 See Appellate Body Report, Interpretation, WT/DS2/AB/R (1996).
253 See US.-Shrimp/Turtle, supra note 41.
254 Id 1134.
255 Id TJ 127-34.
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conservation of the environment."25 6 To reach this conclusion, the
Appellate Body examined the Convention on International Trade
in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, external to the
WTO Agreements, to inform its determination that sea turtles, a
species threated by extinction, are "exhaustible natural
resources."257 Thus, the WTO adjudicating bodies have employed
interpretive incorporation to articulate a general exception that is
similar to the "public morals" exception.
4. Implicit consent to interpretive incorporation of non-
WTO jurisprudence
Even China, in its most recent White Paper, expressed public
support and called for a global network to oversee issues relating
to the Internet.258 The White Paper emphasizes the need for the
United Nations to possess the full scope of international Internet
administration through the establishment of an authoritative and
just international administration organization. 25 9  A call for
regulation under the U.N. system would compel the application of
an even more extensive body of substantive international law on
the member states' control of the Internet. Specifically, the
various responsible judicial bodies, in addition to those of the
WTO, would scrutinize all violations of all the rights guaranteed
by U.N. conventions concerning the Internet platform. The Office
of the High Commissioner of Human Rights (OHCHR) alone
monitors nine core international human rights treaty bodies, one of
which is the HRC, which only implements the ICCPR.2 60 Thus, if
256 Id. 129.
257 Id. 132 (citing the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species
of Wild Fauna and Flora, app. 1, Mar. 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087, 993 U.N.T.S. 243
(1973)). Importantly, the Appellate Body specifically declined to rule on whether there
is a territorial or jurisdictional limitation in Article XX(g) and whether the
"extraterritorial" nature of the U.S. measure removed it from eligibility for an exception
under that provision. It was able to do so because the sea turtles at issue are migratory,
migrating to and from U.S. waters. See id 133.
258 See WHITE PAPER, supra note 25, § IV.
259 See id § VI.
260 The other eight human rights treaty bodies include: The Committee on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), the Committee on the Elimination of
Racial Discrimination (CERD), the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination
Against Women (CEDAW), the Committee Against Torture (CAT), the Committee on
the Rights of the Child (CRC), the Committee on Migrants Workers (CMW), the
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the Chinese government, as expressed in its White Paper,
welcomes the application of the broader legal bodies of law under
the United Nations, then it should have no objection to the WTO's
seeking guidance from the HRC's existing interpretation of the
"public morals" concept in international public law.
C. Unilateral Action Begets Unilateral Action
Unilateral actions, either legal state actions261  or those
stemming from private compacts,26 2 do not resolve the issue in the
long-run. Human rights violations that negatively affect
international economic order, and vice versa, are global problems
that must be addressed on a global scale. Unilateral actions have
the potential to worsen the state of human rights by allowing
Internet companies engaging in violations to proliferate outside of
their domestic markets without legitimate control mechanisms 2 63
and by allowing the increasing supply of amoral companies to
work with other oppressive governments.2 " Unilateral actions
against China's treatment of Internet companies, without
intervention from the WTO, would legally justify-and thus
solidify-China's unilateral protectionist censorship measure.26 5
At the same time, resorting to unilateral action over multilateral
action defeats the purposes of the WTO, which are to liberalize
Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), the Committee on
Enforced Disappearance (CED), and all the bodies' corresponding treaties. OFFICE OF
THE U.N. HIGH COMM'R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, Human Rights Treaty Bodies,
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/treaty/index.htm (last visited Oct. 15, 2012).
261 The Global Online Freedom Act of 2009 is an example of a legal state action; it
has yet to become a bill. Global Online Freedom Act of 2009, H.R. 2271, 111th Cong.
(2009).
262 An example of a private compact is the Global Network Initiative. Governance,
Accountability and Learning Framework, GLOBAL NETWORK INITIATIVE,
http://globalnetworkinitiative.org/sites/default/files/GNI_-
GovernanceAccountabilityLearning.pdf (last visited Oct. 15, 2012) [hereinafter
GLOBAL NETWORK INITIATIVE].
263 See generally Bobbie Johnson, Amnesty Criticises Global Network Initiative for
Online Freedom of Speech, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 30, 2008) available at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2008/oct/30/amnesty-global-network-initiative
(criticizing the Global Network Initiative's participants).
264 See id.
265 See Jian Junbo, Internet Claims Too Testy for China, ASIA TIMES ONLINE (May
27, 2010), available at http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/LE27Ad01 .html.
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trade by multilateral cooperation and to reduce unilateral
barriers.2 66
In 2008, Google, Microsoft, and Yahoo! launched a private
unilateral action called the Global Network Initiative (Initiative) to
protect and advance the freedom of expression and privacy in
information and communication technology against authoritative
governments. 2 67  The principles of the Initiative outline the
obligations that are embedded in the ICCPR.2 68 The Initiative also
delineates precise and concrete applications for participating
companies, requiring corporations to interpret restrictions
narrowly and to challenge restrictions contradicting international
human rights law.269
But the Initiative is still far from resolving the problems of
political censorship and trade protectionism. 27 0  One of the main
concerns is that the Initiative does not provide enough protection
for human rights and is still weak in its principles. 271 Reporters
Without Borders withdrew its endorsement of the Initiative,
asserting that the Initiative should have completely rejected any
compliance with oppressive local laws.2 72 Moreover, even if the
Initiative were to outright reject all requirements for compliance,
the Initiative still could not yield enough pressure to exert much
leverage on oppressive regimes to negotiate away the imposed
surveillance requirements.27 3  Google, Microsoft, and Yahoo!, as
recognized by the European Parliament, do not possess the market
266 See id.
267 GLOBAL NETWORK INITIATIVE, supra note 262, at 1.
268 See Global Network Initiative, Implementation Guidelines for the Principles on
Freedom of Expression and Privacy (2012), available at
http://globalnetworkinitiative.org/implementationguidelines/index.php.
269 See id
270 See Johnson, supra note 263.
271 See id.; see also Why Reporters Without Borders Is Not Endorsing the Global
Principles on Freedom of Expression and Privacy for ICT Companies Operating in
Internet-restricting Countries, REPORTERS WITHOUT BORDERS (Oct. 28, 2008),
http://en.rsf.org/why-reporters-without-borders-is-28-10-2008,29117.html [hereinafter
REPORTERS WITHOUT BORDERS]. But see Press Release, Harvard University, Quote from
Arvind Ganesan (Oct. 28, 2008) (expressing that the Initiative is "an important step
forward").
272 See REPORTERS WITHOUT BORDERS, supra note 271, 1.
273 See generally Johnson, supra note 263 (explaining that the Initiative is not
strong enough for endorsement).
146 [Vol. XXXVIII
ONLINE AND LINKED IN: PUBLIC MORALS
power to induce change in Chinese policy.274  Therefore, the
implementation of the Initiative would have the unintended
reverse effect; 275 that is, its withdrawal would implicitly make the
Chinese government's trade barrier successful, abetting repression
by inaction.
Even more troubling, the Initiative potentially digs a one-way
trade channel flowing out from China to the rest of the world.
Within China, there are a great number of companies ready to be
the up-and-coming names on the Internet platform, and there is an
increasingly expanding pool of sophisticated users to match-an
estimated 718 million by 2013.276 Thus, the withdrawal allowed
companies like Baidu to take advantage of the isolated domestic
market to strengthen themselves before taking over the global
market.27 7 As China's leading search engine following Google's
pullout, Baidu claimed 75% of the market share of China in early
2011, with its stock price rising 2300% from 2006 to 2011.278 Sina
Corp., NetEase.com, Sohu.com, Baidu, and other companies that
proliferated in China have already accessed the global market.279
Demand from global investors remains high for Chinese Internet
companies, despite their willingness to engage in domestic
censorship and violate human rights.28 0  The Chinese Internet
274 Google has requested that the United States government treat Internet
censorship as a trade barrier. See Andrew McLaughlin, Censorship as Trade Barrier,
GOOGLE PUBLIC POLICY BLOG (June 22, 2007, 3:36 P.M.),
http://googlepublicpolicy.blogspot.com/2007/06/censorship-as-trade-barrier.html; see
also Resolution, on the EU's Strategy to Deliver Market Access for European
Companies, EUR.PARL. Doc. (2007/2185(INI)) 2008 O.J. (C 184) E/16.
275 See generally Johnson, supra note 263 (attacking the "weaknesses" of the
Initiative).
276 Xiaoji Qiang, User-Generated Content Online Now 50.7% of Total, CHINA
DAILY (July 23, 2010, 3:42 P.M.), http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/2010-
07/23/content 11042851 .htm.
277 See Belinda Cao, Sina Leads Gains in China Internet Stocks as Gmail Blocked,
BLOOMBERG (Mar. 21, 2011, 3:44 P.M.), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-03-
21 /sina-leads-gains-in-chinese-internet-stocks-as-google-says-gmail-blocked.html.
278 Ramy Inocencio, Gold Rush for Chinese Internet Stocks, CNN (Mar. 31, 2011,
6:01 A.M.), http://newsstream.blogs.cnn.com/2011/03/31/gold-rush-for-chinese-internet-
stocks/.
279 Cao, supra note 277, 2 ("NetEase.com (NTES) Inc., Sohu.com Inc. (SOHU)
and Baidu Inc., each climbed at least 3 percent as the Nasdaq Composite Index advanced
for a third day.").
280 See id. (illustrating the strength of Chinese Internet companies).
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company Qihoo 360 demonstrated this demand:2 8 ' "[w]hen ...
Qihoo 360 went public ... on the New York Stock Exchange,
shares immediately doubled on opening, according to
CNNMoney. The company had priced its stock at $14.50, but the
stock soared as high as $33.40 its first day of trade."2 82
In January 2008, Baidu launched its search engine service in
Japan, "marking its first major overseas venture."28 3 In 2010,
Baidu's Chief Executive, Robin Li, stated that "he is planning to
expand into new countries.. ."284 When Internet companies like
Baidu expand beyond China, they can easily conform to the
foreign states' censorship requirements, or lack thereof.285 These
companies benefit from their flexibility, accommodating
oppressive regimes while simultaneously catering to more open
governments.286
Furthermore, if censorship is not addressed under the global
trade regime, unilateral measures could lead China to develop a
state-controlled Internet platform.2 87 In August 2010, Xinhua and
the largest state-owned Chinese telecommunication operator,
China Mobile, signed an agreement to create a joint venture called
the Search Engine New Media International Communications
Co. 2 88 The joint venture's mission is to launch a search engine that
281 See Inocencio, supra note 278, 12.
282 Id. T 12.
283 Mariko Sanchanta & Mure Dickie, Baidu to Launch Japanese Service,
FIN.TIMES (Jan. 22, 2008, 11:24 P.M.), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/33cfdf82-c92a- I1dc-
9807-000077b07658.html#axzzlItvGQMt2(subscription required).
284 Joseph Menn, Baidu CEO Plans Expansion Beyond Japan, FIN. TIMES TECH
BLOG (Nov. 16, 2010, 2:56 A.M.), http://blogs.ft.com/fttechhub/2010/l l/baidu-ceo-
plans-expansion-beyond-japan/.
285 See generally John Liu, Baidu Web Site with Links to Porn, China Critics, is
Blocked, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 18, 2007, 1:36 P.M.), http://www.bloomberg.com/
apps/news?pid-newsarchive&sid=aWqRk.O7tXw&refer-home (showing varied
restrictions based on country).
286 Baidu's varied censorship was best demonstrated on April 18, 2007, when
Baidu.com Inc. announced that the Chinese government had blocked Baidu.jp, its search
engine for Japan, for two days when the Japanese search engine returned links to
pornography and criticism of the Chinese regime. Id. at paras. 1-2.
287 See generally Xinhua, China Mobile to Establish Internet Search Engine Joint
Venture, XINHUA (Aug. 12, 2010), http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2010-
08/12/c_13442049.htm (discussing an agreement between Xinhua and China Mobile
Communications Corp.).
288 Id. at paras. 1-2.
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is directly controlled by the State.289 Such a move would give the
state government control over both the Internet and the active
mobile phone network, as well as over future political discourse.2 90
In this case, both the trade and the human rights dialogue
regarding censorship would come to an abrupt end.
The demand for amoral Internet companies by authoritarian
regimes will only increase as political activism proliferates on and
through the Internet.29 1 Reporters Without Borders reported that
there are "[a]round 60 countries ... implementing some form of
Internet censorship, which entails either content filtering or
netizen harassment."2 9 2  The organization also detected an
increasing number of countries engaging in censorship.29 3 For
example, Bangladesh recently blocked access to sites offensive to
the Prophet, while Cambodia has begun censoring news sites.2 9 4
Thus, a global demand for search engines and Internet companies
that are willing to engage in information policing is expected in
the near future. 29 5 This increased demand will be satisfied by the
supply of amoral Internet companies unless censorship is
addressed globally. According to the European Centre for
International Political Economy, "[i]n a European Parliament
hearing on Human Rights in June 2010, Hosuk Lee-Makiyama
warned against unilateral sanctions advocated by free speech
groups that would have detrimental effect on China relations, free
speech, and EU/US business interests. ... 296 Instead, he
advocated for "trade negotiations, as China is a 'responsible
289 See id at para. 4.
290 See INTERNET ENEMIES, supra note 1, at 17.
291 See generally Yutian Ling, Upholding Free Speech and Privacy Online: A
Legal-Based and Market-Based Approach for Internet Companies in China, 27 SANTA
CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 175, 193 (2010-11) (illustrating the difficult
position Internet companies are put in when working with China).
292 INTERNET ENEMIES, supra note 1, at 5.
293 See id. (giving examples of censoring activities in Bangladesh and Cambodia).
294 Id.
295 See id. (analyzing the increasing prevalence of Internet censorship).
296 Press Release, European Centre for Int'l Political Econ., Google's Position on
Censorship as a Trade Barrier (Nov. 16, 2010) [hereinafter ECIPE], available at
http://www.ecipe.org/media/pressreleasepdfs/prm 2010-11-23.pdf; see generally
Hosuk Lee-Makiyama, EUROPEAN CENTRE FOR INT'L POLITICAL ECON.,
http://www.ecipe.org/people/hosuk-lee-makiyama/ ("Hosuk Lee-Makiyama is Director
of the European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE).").
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member of the WTO."' 297 Thus, resolving this situation under the
WTO is more reasonable, less political, and more likely to yield a
long-term and stable solution if enough states join in the dispute.298
V. Conclusion
The Internet creates an open forum that facilitates human
interaction in a realistic and comprehensive manner, economically,
politically, and socially. As of 2011, the number of Internet users
stood at approximately 2,267,233,742 out of approximately seven
billion people worldwide. 299  Any interference affecting such
magnitude requires a critical re-examination of all available
international legal institutions and instruments to determine ways
in which these already existing institutions might build capacity.
Although censorship is a trade barrier and a violation of human
rights,3 00 it can be justified under both the WTO general
exceptions clause and the human rights "public morals"
exception.30 ' Due to the similarity between and relatedness of
these "public morals" exceptions, a narrow and mutually
beneficial linkage can be formed between the two regimes.3 02
Through interpretive incorporation of the human rights
jurisprudence on "public morals" concerning Internet censorship,
this linkage would bring about positive results for both
international trade and human rights by strengthening their
individual purposes while also reinforcing each other's existence
and authority.
297 ECIPE, supra note 296, at para. 8.
298 See Aisha Husain, Framing the International Standard on the Global Flow of
Information on the Internet, 3 INTERDISC. J. HuM. RTs. L. 35, 46 (2008-09).
299 Usage and Population Statistics, INTERNET WORLD STATS (Dec. 31, 2011),
http://www.intemetworldstats.com/stats.htm (last visited Oct. 15, 2012).
300 See Husain, supra note 298.
301 See generally Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human
Rights, Human Rights and World Trade Agreements: Using General Exception Clauses
to Protect Human Rights, U.N. Doc. HR/PUB/05/5 (Nov. 2005), available at
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/WTOen.pdf (discussing the use of
general exception clauses in WTO agreements).
302 See id
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